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At the closing page (181) of his latest book Constitutional Problems of the European Union,
T.C. Hartley has come to the end of his personal quest for certainty about Europe. It has been
a long journey but the goal has been reached, doubts dispelled. In the first printing of Hartley’s
grand work, Foundations (1981), a copy of which I cherish, there loomed a dilemma. The
Community is “unstable in its present form: either it will go forward to become a federation
or it will regress and eventually break up” (p. 6). The author seemed to favour the first road,
of federalism: France’s Conseil d’ ´Etat when banning direct effect (in Cohn Bendit) “struck a
blow at the foundations of the Community.” (p. 236) In later editions, the conviction wavered
but the perspective stood.1
In the present little work there is an about-face. Or, rather, there is the completion of
one which could be felt coming for a while. Its foreword finds the author doubting that the
Union will become a federation, yet on the other hand “there are no signs that it is about to
collapse or wither away”, so instead of expecting regression and break-up it becomes “vital
to understand what sort of entity it is.” From there, he undertakes a thorough criticism of the
Community’s claims and methods. Cohn Bendit is now treated to a note of sympathy (even
though the Conseil d’ ´Etat itself has since given in – in Nicolo). The ECJ’s Van Duyn (direct
effect of directives) is blandly “contrary to the Treaty” (p. 29). In this vein, the author thrashes
most of the sacred cows of Community Law and especially its herdsman the ECJ, which is
often found to act in clear violation of the Treaty’s spirit, if not its letter. Nor are the other
institutions spared the whip. The Council, where “Member States sometimes enter into secret
agreements”, contributes to the vagueness of Community Law. The Commission fails to get
Community Law enforced evenly between North and South. the Parliament “fails to provide
1. See also Hartley “Federalism, Courts and legal systems: The emerging constitution of
the European Community”, (1986) AJIL, 229.
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a mechanism for popular opinion to influence Community policy” (p. 19). And, finally, he is
ready to dispose with the idea of constitutional autonomy of the Community order and of the
Treaties no longer dependent for their validity on international or domestic law. Here is how:
“The problem with this theory is that, even if it is accepted by the European Court, there
is no evidence that it is accepted by any of the governments of the Member States or by
any of their courts: : : . At present, therefore, it suffers from a ’reality deficit’: at the crucial
moment, the rabbit stubbornly refuses to come out of the hat, no matter how frantically the
magician waves his wand.”
To one sometimes exasperated by the evangelism of Community Law text-books, this book
comes as a delicious debunk. Apart from its crystal line of argument, which is itself a tribute
to the constitutional tradition, it covers the field elegantly and wittily. Why then is it in the last
instance disappointing? Let this be the question inspiring the present review essay.
The Decade of European constitutionalism
In the summer of 1993, the Strasbourg Graduate Institute of European Studies hosted a con-
ference of mostly French constitutionalists, clashing over Europe. Those who were privileged
to attend, vividly recall the great Louis Favoreu, nestor of the French public law profession,
giving head to the incoming waves of Europeanists headed by Jean-Paul Jacque´. Almost
single-handedly defending his own “certain idea of the constitution”, Favoreu reminded one of
the famous Spartan chief with the name of a now better known Brussels chocolate imperium,
who held up the Persian hordes in the pass of Thermopylai long enough for the Greeks to
realign their defence down south (480 BC, see Herodote Histories, book VII).2 Shortly after,
seeming to answer Favoreu’s call, the German Constitutional Court stood up to deliver its now
notorious “Maastricht judgment” and firmly assert supremacy for the German constitution over
European law.
Events such as these have inaugurated the present decade as one in which the great claims
and questions of integration have converged on European constitutionalism. Joseph Weiler,
never at a loss for new expressions, has called constitutionalism “the DOS or Windows of
the European Community”. He further asserts: “Because constitutionalism captures more than
anything else what is special about the process of European integration it becomes the focal
point of both content and contempt of those involved in the process.”3
In recent years there has indeed occurred a true flood of literature on the theme, breaking
the dykes of the printed press to flow over to the internet.4 The bad news is that this constitu-
tionalism is not producing a common ground of argument and debate. Its scholarship instead
has split up mainly into two self-contained and self-referring communities, which I shall name
the “classical” and the “baroque”. Classical constitutionalism addresses the subject and its
questions in the perspective of simplicity, singularity, order. Baroque constitutionalism goes
under the banner of pluralism, diversity, variety, culture. The question is how each of these
answers the need to understand what is going on in terms of constitutional change.
2. Flauss, (Ed.) “Vers un droit constitutionnel europe´en. Quel droit constitutionnel
europe´en?” 7 RUDH (1995, published 1996), 11–12. At one point in the heated debate Jacque´
exclaimed emotionally and poetically: “What is the use of forms if they cannot allow reality to
express itself?” I personally regret that this gem has not made it into the conference proceed-
ings. The imagery of battle is taken from Steyger, Europe and its Members. A Constitutional
Approach, 1995, chapt. 3, called “Drawing the battle lines”.
3. Weiler, “The Reformation of European Constitutionalism”. In Kreuzer, Scheuing and
Sieber (Eds.), Die Europa¨isierung der mitgliedstaatlichen Rechtsordnungen (Baden-Baden,
1997), pp. 9–40, at 10.
4. See e.g. the site WWW.harvard.edu./Programs/Jean Monnet/papers
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Classical constitutionalism: Order and authority
Classical constitutionalism is of French origin. In France, constitutional debate on Europe
converges on definitions and rules. The French constitution, unlike its German counterpart, for
example, puts no substantive obstacles in the way of Europe. All it takes between France and
Europe is a change in the Constitution whenever the Constitutional Council feels that a Treaty
change affects the exercise of national sovereignty. The constitutional question in France is
simply about sovereignty and order on the one hand, rights and separation of powers on the
other. Louis XIV may or may not have said “L’e´tat c’est moi” but this motto fully satisfies the
first quality required of the constitution: clarity and sovereignty.
Of course it is not just the French who are are classical constitutionalists. The same want
of clarity inspired Deirdre Curtin’s famous complaint in this Review (in 1993) of “A Europe
of bits and pieces”. And Hartley’s above-mentioned attack on the heart of supranationalism
is another unmistakable case. It sticks to the well-known tenets of law, order and authority.
Classical constitutionalism posits no deep allegiance to one or the other system nor to one or
the other political foundation. This is how it has so easily allowed the claim of sovereignty to
be smuggled into European legal doctrine, from Van Gend & Loos and Costa-ENEL onward.
Community legal orthodoxy, with the self-evidence of autonomy, direct effect and supremacy,
is of course a paragon of classical constitutionalism.
How does this strand of thinking measure up to the test of change? No book beats a
recent French PhD thesis from Strasbourg in providing an answer. It is, interestingly, by a
German national, Jo¨rg Gerkrath, though written in elegant French. The book is extremely well
researched in a fully classical spirit (Vlad Constantinesco, supervisor) and densely covers the
history and doctrinal debates on the Union’s increasing constitutional claims, as pressed by
the Court of Justice and by the guardians of the Brussels paradigm (Jacque´ et al.). True to
his German background (if I may be allowed to make this connection), the author does not
adopt this paradigm full-heartedly. On the basis of a thorough historical study of the concept
of Constitution, he holds reservations as to the idea that a European Constitution as such is
nascent, retreating to the safer line that what emerges is, at any rate, European Constitutional
Law. Its development, to be sure, is driven by a “constitutional spirit” (153), a “constitutional
conscience” (223) and similar idealisms. If these do not break into a full constitution, then
surely, through a “constitutional process” (142) they weave a “constitutional web” (re´seau
constitutionnel, pp. 133, 275).
This analytical and historical approach is well-geared to free the author (and the reader)
from the idea that a constitution can only be the attribute of a State. Yet it also begs the question:
where does Union Law fall short of the full thing? Gerkrath gives the answer: in two respects.
First, there is no constitutive act of authority (herrschaftskonstituierend, p. 47, here the author
trusts only his native German); second, no new authority of constitutional amendment has been
created, the surest sign of authenticity (166 et seq.). This point is very well set up – and driven
home.
To qualify as a Constitution, it is no help that the founding treaties increasingly add up to a
labyrinth, understandable only to insiders (he gladly borrows their well-known disqualification
by Curtin as “constitutional chaos”, p. 142). Lack of clarity about the relationship between it
and the Members’ constitutions affects the Union’s Constitution’s authority (257). Until further
notice, the relationship is in a state of constitutional ambiguity. If that. At p. 286 we even read
that “the national constitutions do not go so far as to allow their essential principles to be drawn
into question”. This aporia does not prevent Gerkrath from detailing the aspects in which a
constitutional momentum is being built up. The Treaties have become “constitutionalized” in
a formal and in a substantive sense, especially by the Court of Justice. The formal approach
went by way of the well-known doctrines of autonomy, direct effect, supremacy, conferred
powers, the proclamation of the Treaty’s “constitutional nature” and a hierarchy of rules (p.
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216 et seq.). The substantive approach is principally by way of rights (223–224). All said and
done he seems to be drawn, by the force of logic, to a position close to Hartley’s.
The strength and the weakness of classical thinking is that it does not really allow for contra-
diction or ambiguity. Its weapons are logic and consistency: and the Court of Justice uses these
with skill and rigour. But it is at a loss when up against a similar claim of logic and consistency
(as from Favoreu and the like), or from a claim based on essentialism (as from the German
Constitutional Court). Bound to the force and logic of system, it is unbeatable for setting up
a new system ex nihilo, but does not suffer the ambiguities inherent in gradual evolution or
transition. Classical thinking has had less difficulty with the succession of French constitutional
revolutions than it has with the present twilight-situation involving Europe, which has led to a
trench war in France over the definition of the words constitution and sovereignty.
Baroque constitutionalism: Pluralism and culture
The incapacity of classical thought to account for change (and its ambiguities) will explain
how baroque European constitutionalism has come en vogue from the beginning of the 1990s.
Baroque constitutionalism is concerned to reflect the wealth and depth of reality. It is not afraid
of complexity, or even of contradiction, and has a predilection for culture (which is a paragon
of all these qualities).
An outstanding protagonist is Neil MacCormick, who in his latest book writes, character-
istically, of a “post-sovereign Europe”. The problem of clarity and structure, so dominant in
classical constitutional thinking, vaporizes under this tone of historical optimism, as do clarity
and structure themselves:
“Let us consider the possibility of institutions that by their discourse and deliberation come
to be constitutive of a common good, or of the common perception of a shared good that
is itself an intrinsic good and an instrumental condition of willing mobilization of group
and individual effort in fulfilling a common legal order grounded in acts of legislation and
in the pursuit of highest-level economic and security policies”. (“Democracy, Subsidiarity,
and Citizenship in the ’European Commonwealth”’, at p. 8 of the book under review.)
An even more radically pluralist definition of the same notion is found in another chapter
of the same book, by Bellamy and Castiglione. They go for a “highly differentiated social
system [which] is characterized by numerous subsystems each governed by its own rules and
practices.” Sovereignty, they hold,
“does not lose its relevance in such a situation. If anything, the need for autoritative
mecanisms capable of mediating between diverse values and interests increases rather than
diminishes. However, sovereignty does need to be reconfigurated to reflect the competing
attachments and norms emanating from the various spheres of people’s lives, and the
complexities of the relationships that exist between them: : :That suggests that sovereignty
will also be plural, because more dispersed, with different persons or bodies having the
power to decide in different circumstances, without there necessarily being any single,
hierarchical system of decision-making.” (“Building the Union: the Nature of Sovereignty
in the Political Architecture of Europe”, at p. 92 of the book under review.)
Francis Snyder (Florence, and many other places) with his long-drawn General Course of
1995 (published 1998) is also in this vanguard. Central to Snyder’s concern is not, as with
Gerkrath, the orderly relationship between the EU charters and those of the Member States,
but that between the EU and the people: a constitution “in the subjective sense” (p. 55). From
here, Snyder goes on to free himself from the constrictions of classical thought: “The task
of the makers of EU constitutional law thus is how to organize relations of authority in a
non-hierarchical and polycentric polity, taking authority to refer to the legitimate exercise
of power.” (ibid.) His “intellectual experiment” (74) which in a space of more than hundred
dense pages will amount to “merely a preliminary attempt to set out the main lines of enquiry
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regarding the EU constitution”, (154) leads to a reappraisal of “constitutional culture” as a
more potent agent of European constitutionalization than structure or principles:
“My hypotheses are threefold. First, a constitutional culture which is specific to the EU
is now emerging and being created at the individual, organizational and societal levels.
Second, its main features are not at all fixed, nor are they by any means entirely coherent
and free from contradiction. Third, there exist both an internal legal culture of the EU,
founded on the elite emerging and operating within the legal and political systems of the
Union, and an external or general legal culture visible at a broader and more general level
which takes into account the different national legal and political systems.”(138.)
It is remarkable that Snyder nowhere mentions the long standing champion of cultural con-
stitutionalism, the prolific German writer, Peter Ha¨berle. His “Europa¨ische Rechtskultur”
(1994) is compulsory reading for anyone interested in the core of the baroque culturo-
constitutional paradigm.5 Ha¨berle sings the praise of things held in common, sprinkling the
mystical German prefix “Gemein-” (in the communitarian sense of the word, of the ultimate
social bond of people).6 If instead of Germany you like (and trust) Europe, then Europe
becomes “Gemeineuropa”; European constitutional law is “Gemeineuropa¨isches Verfassungs-
recht”. And it is the cultural unity of Europe which forms the rooting soil (Wurzelboden) for this
One-European constitutional law (p. 53). What this culture amounts to is (again) not sharply
defined, but one of its elements is (to bring us full circle) the idea of a culturul-constitutional
State. And of course there is Weiler, who just published a collection of his essays in The
Constitution of Europe (to be reviewed separately in this Review). Interestingly, Weiler proves
a convert from classical constitutionalism (law and politics, first part of the book) to baroque
(plurality, difference, culture, etc., second part).
Baroque constitutionalism with its appeal to depth, culture, can liberate thinking towards the
future, but it can also do the opposite: to host fear of change. The Maastricht Urteil, grounding
the German Constitution in a historical “Staatsvolk” took the way of fear and conservatism. If
the critical quality of constitutionalism in the case of Europe is whether and how it accounts
for fundamental change, baroque constitutionalism at the face of it has more to offer than
the classical variety, which already breaks down on the logical contradictions of the situation.
But is baroque constitutionalism really more potent? True, admitting the wealth of reality
and the depths of human culture into constitutional thinking is liberating. But the question is
whether ultimately it will help a new compelling and stable form for the relationship between
the domestic and the Union levels of government. After all, one can accept a measure of
creative ambiguity about such questions, yet for a final state of things, undetermined diversity
is no option. There is even a conservative slant. From reading the “baroques”, it appears that
even those who do allow for the dynamic, evolving quality of the situation, will eventually
want to land it back in a pre-existing culturally or even anthropologically (Snyder) defined
environment. In the face of change it is not wholly convincing as, lacking in sense of discipline
(down to the linguistic level, I am sorry to say) it does not seek a “landing site” for change, in
the form of clarification of the basic options.
5. Ha¨berle, Europa¨ische Rechtskultur. Versuch einer Anna¨herung in zwo¨lf Schritten
(Baden-Baden, 1994). He published Verfassungslehre als Kulturwissenschaft in 1982 (and
even Der Sontag als Verfassungsprinzip, 1988).
6. In the German discourse it is possible to express unquestioned appreciation of the
“Gemeinwesen” which is the soul of the Gemeinschaft: community. Gemein- is a complex of
one-ness, togetherness, originality, uniqueness, historicity. Even Weiler’s vocabulary conveys
this communitarian mystique through terms such as “belongingness”, “groupness” (see Weiler,
The Constitution of Europe (Cambridge: CUP, 1999) p. 247, 252 resp.).
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Constitutionalism of change
Change is where logic meets variety. A fairly early book edited by Bieber and Widmer
picks up this challenge. Its title elegantly figures in three languages, i.e. also: Der europa¨ische
Verfassungsraum and The European constitutional area. The title is presumably taken from an
article by Tomuschat “Europe – a Common Constitutional Space”.7 Contributions by a solid
cast of experts (including some of those mentioned above) are in the three tongues too, and
are often original. Take Auer’s “L’adoption et la re´vision des constitutions: de quelques ve´rite´s
malmene´es par les faits”. The author first descends to the fundamentals of constitutionalism
and then resurfaces to their mockery by reality. Revision is a case in point. It is dogma since
Sieye`s that a constitution is only a constitution if it has eaten up its constituants and provides
for its own progeny, including revision. This dogma would preclude the Union from having
anything constitutional, in view of the members’ clinging to their prerogatives of amending.8
The dogma is also the last line of defence in the German argument that there is no European
people. If you haven’t a people to feed to history, how can you expect to be given unity in
return? Well, says Auer, if you look around you, the facts debunk Sieye`s. In all the revolutions
since 1989 in Eastern and Western Europe, one is bound to see that the original constituant
remains alive and kicking as a participant in the constitutional process and change (p. 282,
283).
Conversely, the Union’s ineradicable Member States need not stand in the way of consti-
tutional evolution. Let us see what Pernice, Frankfurt, has to say on the subject. From a long
study of rules concerned with entrenchment-provisions of national constitutions he draws the
original suggestion “to view the Union Constitution not in isolation but als (shared) part of
the members’ constitutions: : :The Members and the Community thus form a Verfassungs-
verbund”. (“Bestandssicherungen der Verfassungen: Verfassungsrechtliche Mechanismen zur
Wahrung der Verfassungsordnung” in Bieber and Widmer, at 262 (my translation)). This mod-
el admits both the Member States’ multiform sovereignties and the latters’ durable uniform
qualification by a common undertaking outside of each individual member’s control. More
than that: it solves the questions of mutual interference between the constitutional levels
elegantly and realistically by way of a paradox: “The supranational intrication (Einbindung)
of the Constitutional State becomes the vehicle for the entrenchment of national rules and
identity. As integral part of the national constitutions, the Treaty-constitution is at once oblig-
ation, entrenchment and token of identity of the Member State in the European constitutional
federation (Verfassungsverbund).” (263)
The virtues of this model are as great as they are obvious. If the European Constitution
is seen as a common, shared (and guaranteed) part of the national constitutions, while the
latter keep the ultimate role of founding State-power, there is no theoretical problem in the
growth of this overlapping common set of constraints and practices, inside the national consti-
tutions. Then it is also logical that, for practical purposes, the ECJ should tend to the common
rules, while the domestic constitutional courts watch over their own constitutions. Pernice has
recently elaborated his views in this Review (“Multilevel constitutionalism and the Treaty of
Amsterdam: European constitution-making revisited” (1999) 703–750).
Another elegant contribution to conceiving change was recently made by Jan Wouters
(Leuven) in a paper put to the Belgian-Netherlands society of comparative law (and soon to
appear in English, LIEI 2000/1.). As is well known, the ECJ has ordained the EC freed from
its different constitutional moorings and legally autonomous. This is a benign fiction from the
7. In De Witte and Forder (Eds.), The common law of Europe and the future of legal
education (Deventer, 1992), pp. 133–147. For an inspired lecture on the basis of the idea of a
European public space: Curtin, Postnational democracy (The Hague, KLI, 1997).
8. See De Witte “Rules of change in international law: How special is the European
Community” (1994) NYIL, p. 299.
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classical repertoire, useful as a pont aux aˆnes for law students, but unsatisfactory otherwise.
The German Constitutional Court has easily trumped the classical fiction by a baroque one,
equally unsatisfactory (Volk, culture). Wouters’ position is, interestingly, that the primacy of
the European Treaties roots not in any inter-system logic but in the acts of acceptance by the
Member States while ratifying the Treaties. Though this sounds much like the ECJ’s mantra
about autonomy, in fact it works out to the contrary. This is because it stresses the constant
presence, albeit in the background, of national authority in the functioning of the system, while
limiting decisive constitutional action to the stage of treaty revision. At the same time it avoids
the parties’ institutions brandishing the national constitution at every opportunity:
“The Court in our opinion would gain from grounding primacy of the European treaties
more explicitly in the Member States’ free participation in these, following ratification in
conformity with their constitutional provisions. It would thus build a bridge to the national
constitutional courts and take at least part of the wind from the sails of constitutional review
a posteriori of treaty provisions.” (96)
This option does not still the calls for constitutional review of secondary legislation. These
however are not a matter of sovereignty (authority) but of rights and democracy.
Wouters’ view is that the Member States have not written themselves out of many of
the system’s ground rules, as the ECJ would have us believe. And that the Court, instead
of considering itself above the Member States, should refer matters back to them in their
compound (The European Council, at Treaty Revision). If these Member States together
originally committed themselves far beyond what is expressly provided in the Treaties, it was
on the authoritity of their constitutions. These are not groceries of competences; they are the
platform of sovereign action.9
This may turn out to be the key to understanding the Union’s constitutional capacity in a
context of change. The change is not in the law, nor in the culture, but in the facts. Addressing
as he does the question in its core: “where is the locus of constitutional authority?” Wouters’
answer must be that it is twofold. First it is with the national polities independently, acting out
of their constitutions. This is no problem. The problem lies with the second locus of authority.
This consists of the Member States acting in concert, as a political community of sorts. “The
Member States’ free participation” (Wouters) is the key. If, fifty years back, this was merely a
meeting of interests brokered by law and chance, it is now, with each treaty revision, becoming
more of a compound, with the European Council as its political actor. This is neither legal logic
nor cultural foundation, it is the break of constitutional practice for the Union’s evolution.
Returning now to Hartley and Gerkrath, it is interesting to see how they both recoil from this
idea of constitutional practice, especially the latter. In his opening chapters, Gerkrath is clearly
enticed by the spirit and power of informalities of the British Constitution.10 When forced
however (at gunpoint, one has the impression) to pick the attributes of a constitution which
will make the difference, he seeks refuge behind (classical) formalities such as supremacy,
entrenchment, constitutional review. He doesn’t realize that legal formalities may be signs of
weakness. Elevating those formal attributes to arbiters of authority, Gerkrath leads himself to
discount the most historical, British, experience and to idealize the German Grundgesetz.
9. There is a predicament attached to constitutionalism which becomes apparent in the
European context. It is that of seeing the constitution primarily as a limit to power and ignoring
that a constitution not only limits, but also empowers sovereign action.
10. Gerkrath is aware of the Union Constitution’s likeness to the British. The latter also
lacks clarity and singularity as well as the presence of a founding moment and authority. Yet
it is the oldest and most solid one existent. There are obvious similarities, such as the fact
that the Community Constitution lacks a constituent act, and is being made from day to day
(23). Even the great Alfred Verdross, in his perceptive (albeit speculative) studies on a “public
international constitution”, turns to the British model, as Gerkrath himself notices (104).
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He would have been well advised to side not with Tocqueville but with Montesquieu,
who admired English constitutional wisdom (and even said that it was found in the German
forests).11 This would have allowed Gerkrath to deal with rules and fact alike, to account
for the fact-formed nature of constitutional evolution. About institutional practice (the facts)
he writes that it happens only “at an infra-constitutional plane” (229). We know differently,
since the March 1999 clash between European Parliament and European Council (about the
Commission).12
Now, finally, about Hartley’s rabbit and hat. Hartley says there is no rabbit. The Community
has no original authority. Sovereignty over Britannia rests fully with Parliament which “cannot
validly limit its own future powers” (170). I wonder, if this were so, how Parliament’s sover-
eignty allowed the actual emancipation of Australia, Canada, the dismantling of the Empire
(not to speak of the present devolution to Wales and Scotland)? The rule that Parliament cannot
limit its own future power is not meant to be in the way of reality, but to force constitutional
change to be the business of politics instead of being at the mercy of the judiciary (as happens
in Germany). In Jacque´’s golden phrase: it is a form allowing reality to express itself. (supra
note 2).
Hartley seems to run for shelter behind a legal fiction instead of staying put, to seek
accommodation for what is coming. This is particularly regrettable as constitutionalism in the
British tradition, with its ultimate sovereignty of fact (practice), has probably more to offer
thinking about the Union than either the classical or the baroque counterparts.
W.T. Eijsbouts
Amsterdam
Olivier De Schutter, Fonction de juger et droits fondamentaux. Transformation du controˆle
juridictionnel dans les ordres juridiques ame´ricain et europe´ennes. Brussels: Bruylant, 1999.
1164 pages. Price BF 7600.
Today, fundamental rights have forced their way into many branches of law and are applied
in many different ways. Still the expansion has its price, says De Schutter. Welfare State
interventions to protect citizens against the many risks of life endanger the individual’s right to
self-determination and, as fundamental rights proliferate, conflicts amongst rights multiply. The
judiciary adapted to this multiplication of conflicts by developing the technique of “balancing
of interests”, which makes it possible to solve conflicts, without providing for all hypothetical
cases that could arise.
It is this transformation in the law of fundamental rights that makes the core subject of
De Schutter’s doctoral thesis. The author starts from the presumption that the importance that
can be attributed to the technique of “balancing of interests” is completely dependent upon
the procedural law under which an appeal is brought. Accordingly he focuses on three widely
differing legal orders: the United States, the European Community and the legal order of the
European Convention of Human Rights. The first part of the book discusses the concept of
efficiency (effectivite´) of fundamental rights in the three above mentioned legal orders. De
11. ‘Si l’on veut lire l’admirable ouvrage de Tacite sur les moeurs des Germains, on verra
que c’est d’eux que les Anglais ont tire´ l’ide´e de leur gouvernement politique. Ce beau syste`me
a e´te´ trouve´ dans les bois’ (XI/VI, my emphasis).
12. For a full analysis underpinning the remark that this was in fact a clash between the EP
and the European Council (= the assembly of political leaders), see my contribution in (1999)
NJB, 627–635.
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Schutter concludes that the opposition between efficiency and formalism always seems to be
controlled through a certain form of “balancing of interests”. The second part develops on the
plurality of objectives of an action (pluralite´ des objets du litige). When bringing a lawsuit, a
plaintiff does not only want his rights to be enforced. He may also aim at respect for the law in
general and at the creation of a precedent. Here the author discusses in depth the meaning of
the doctrine of stare decisis and the effects in time of judicial decisions. In the third part, De
Schutter engages in a study of the progressive separation in fundamental rights case law of the
need to show an interest in bringing an action from the right one wants to see enforced. He links
this phenomenon with the concept of efficiency and plurality of objectives, and highlights that
a plaintiff may not only have a material interest in having his right enforced, but may also want
the other above-mentioned objectives to be realized. De Schutter therefore proposes to broaden
the requirement of “an interest in bringing an action” and calls this new concept autonomie.
The fourth and last part of the book is dedicated to the role of groups in the case law of the
three legal systems under consideration. This role appears to be a double one. On the one hand,
groups contribute, through class actions, to the objective of respect for the law in general. On
the other hand, an increasing number of groups intervene in legal proceedings as amici curiae.
In doing so they help the judge to find the solution that is legally most correct and thus add to
the efficiency of fundamental rights.
It is clear from this publication that De Schutter took great pains to make his doctoral thesis
a well-written, well-documented and intelligent piece. His widely ranging insights gained
through many stays abroad, both as a student and researcher and as a teacher, turned his work




F. Sudre (Ed.), L’interpre´tation de la Convention europe´enne des droits de l’homme. Brussels:
Etablissements Emile Bruylant and Editions Nemesis, 1998. 352 pages. ISBN 2-8027-1162-8.
BF 3000.
The Council of Europe may be seen as the rival of the European Union in the battle for
being the driving force of tying together the European States. The Council of Europe’s most
important achievement is probably the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), with
the European Court on Human Rights as its main supervising body. Although the Committee
of Ministers also plays a role in supervising the compliance with the Convention, the focus
should rightfully be placed on the Court. Like its counterpart the ECJ, the European Court of
Human Rights has to deal with the problem of interpretation of the Convention. This raises
questions as to e.g. the methods of interpretation used by the Court and the consistency of
the interpretation. Also questions may be raised as to the authority of the interpretation by
an international Court, which is by definition not democratically legitimized, especially when
broad interpretations of the Convention obligations are given.
This book is the result of a colloquium held on 13 and 14 March 1998 by the Institute for
European Human Rights Law of the Law Faculty of the University of Montpellier I. It contains
articles by some eminent, mainly French, authors, who have focused on different aspects of
the interpretation of the ECHR. The book is divided in three parts, covering the coherence,
the specificity and the authority of interpretation, and includes a foreword by Pettiti and an
introduction by Matscher, respectively the French and the Austrian judge at the Court.
The part on the coherence of interpretation has two contributions. The first article, by
Rigaux, is on the so-called consensual and evolutive interpretation, that is used to make the
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codified Treaty provisions applicable to ever-changing circumstances. For instance, the right to
respect for family life has been extended by the Court to non-married couples, contrary to the
original intent of the drafters of the Convention. Rigaux defends this method of interpretation
against the criticism that it imposes on States obligations they have not committed themselves
to when signing the Convention, thus invading the State’s sovereignty. The character of the
ECHR, Rigaux argues, is somewhat that of a constitution – the Court has not been instituted
and given supervising power for no reason. The mere institution of the Convention organs is in
itself a clear expression of the will of the signatory States to give the Convention, as it were, a
life of its own. The Court itself also frequently holds that the Convention is a living instrument,
and has to be interpreted in present-day conditions. Furthermore, it is problematic when States
themselves may decide what exact obligations come out of a human rights Convention. The
concept of sovereignty is awkward in the field of human rights. A parallel may be drawn with
the ECJ, which also has to interpret a Treaty in continually changing circumstances, and which
has developed the idea of the European Community as an autonomous legal order, also seeming
to lead some kind of life of its own, independent from the national legal orders. The second
contribution, by Lambert, gives a good oversight of the doctrines of the margin of appreciation
and the review of proportionality, where he emphasizes the dangers of the doctrine of the
margin of appreciation. The doctrine is used to counterbalance the loss of sovereignty by the
signatory States, by giving the national authorities a margin of appreciation in certain areas.
One problem is, however, that the application of the doctrine by the Court is inconsistent. A
more fundamental objection against the doctrine is that it is an evasion by the Court of its own
responsibility. It is the Court that has been endowed with the power to supervise compliance
with the Convention, and it is its task to uphold the European human rights order, which implies
that national particularisms have no role to play where the substance of human rights is in play.
The second part of the book focuses on what is labelled the specificity of the interpretation.
Sudre deals with the autonomous notions of the ECHR, which are notions labelled as such by
the Court. He shows the difficulties and the advantages of the technique of detaching judicial
terms from the meaning they have in the diverse national legal systems, and giving them their
own “European” meaning. In this way, signatory States cannot evade their duties under the
Convention by using their own national terminology. Sudre tries to show that autonomous
interpretation and the concept of the national margin of appreciation are not opposites on a
level playing field: autonomization is a technique used in interpreting the Convention, whereas
leaving a margin of appreciation to national authorities is the exertion of judicial self-restraint
by the Court and is directed at the conditions under which a right can be exercised. It is
submitted that, however true this may be, the distinction is rather academic: it does not make
much difference whether the State’s obligations are determined by limiting or extending the
interpretation of a right or by limiting or extending its application. What count in the end
are the obligations imposed by the Court on the signatory States for the protection of human
rights. It must be admitted that Sudre skilfully shows that the use of autonomous notions is a
useful complementary method in the formation of a common European legal order, though he
finds a more thorough motivation by the Court on the contents of the specific contents of each
autonomous notion desirable.
In his contribution, Spielmann writes about the so-called positive obligations and the hori-
zontal effect of the Convention provisions. He gives an oversight of the Strasbourg case law
on positive obligations, and pleads for more convergence where the horizontal effect or Drit-
twirkung of the Convention in the diverse national jurisdictions is concerned. As the Court
itself never deals with complaints against individuals, it uses the doctrine of the positive oblig-
ations to impose on States the duty to protect individuals in horizontal relations. Tavernier’s
contribution is on the scope of the competence of the supervising bodies, and focuses on the
questions concerning the competence of the Commission and the Court, where he emphasizes
the competence of the bodies to determine their own competence (Kompetenz-Kompetenz).
Time will tell how the Court’s case law on its competence develops, regard being had to the
Book reviews 223
entry into force of the 11th Protocol, (which discards the Commission), and the enlargement
of the Council of Europe due to developments in Eastern Europe.
The third part of the book deals with the authority of the interpretation. The contributions deal
mainly with the relations between the interpretation of national judges and the interpretation
by the European Court of Human Rights. Grewe takes a comparative perspective in describing
the position of constitutional judges vis-a`-vis the European interpretation. Marge´naud focuses
on the private law judge (juge judiciaire) and insists that a coherent Strasbourg case law is
much more authoritative than a constraining case law. Pacteau’s contribution is on the French
administrative judge and the European interpretation. More exciting is Picod’s contribution
on the ECJ and the interpretation by the European Court on Human Rights of the ECHR.
Picod draws a good comparison between methods of interpretation used by the two Courts,
and shows that both use the methods of teleological and evolutive interpretation. However
true Picod’s assessment may be that both Courts have shown the will to avoid contradictory
solutions, one cannot but get the impression that the ECJ is not too committed to giving a high
level of protection to human rights in European Community law. The ECHR is treated as a
general principle of law in European Community law, where the interpretation of the ECHR
given by the European Court of Human Rights will be taken in consideration. The general
impression remains that protection of fundamental rights still is an issue that is dealt with only
“on the side” by the ECJ. It must not be forgotten that the ECJ’s initial reluctance to apply
human rights could only be overcome after opposition of the German and Italian constitutional
judges. Picod is regrettably not too outspoken on this point.
Inevitably, the different contributions to the book do vary in depth and thoroughness. On the
whole, the book is certainly a valuable contribution for the libraries of those who are interested
in the subject of Treaty interpretation, and should be welcomed.
Peter Mendelts
Utrecht
Marie-The´re`se Bitsch, Wilfried Loth and Raymond Poidevin (Eds.), Institutions europe´ennes
et identite´s europe´ennes. Brussels: Bruylant, 1998. 523 pages. BF 2850.
This book is a collection of two dozen papers presented at two conferences, in Essen in
May 1996 and in Strasbourg in September 1997, devoted to examining the question of the
relationship between various European institutions and the emergence of a European con-
sciousness or common identity. To what extent have institutions created to foster cooperation
and integration reinforced a shared sense of Europeanness? A second preoccupation concerns
the idea of Europe held by key decision-makers. What does “Europeanness” signify to them?
The fourteen papers of the first part of the book focus on various European organizations and
their diverse aims, while the ten papers in the second part of the book concentrate on the role
of individuals and the functioning of common institutions. This distinction sometimes seems
somewhat artificial, but the collection as a whole is both strong and varied.
The book’s first part commences with two papers which examine the League of Nations
as the inspiration for the later development of pan-European institutions. Guillen considers
cooperation in the fields of education and culture, concluding that the League of Nations
opened up spaces for discussion and exchange between teachers, artists, academics and other
intellectuals from various European States, thus contributing to the emergence of a common
sense of European identity. Sylvain Schirmann explores the history of monetary cooperation
at the start of the 1930s, when the relatively stable financial system achieved during the
previous decade disintegrated into three blocs. When the British, together with Portugal and
the Scandinavian countries, abandoned gold in 1931, other western European States (France,
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Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Belgium) remained faithful to the gold standard. In a
third zone, central and south-eastern Europe, exchange controls became increasingly severe.
The League of Nations attempted to maintain the international financial order but was ultimately
unsuccessful.
Two papers by Ska¨r examine, respectively, the political philosophy of the British Conservat-
ive Party between 1945 and 1955 and the activities of the “Strasbourg Tories” in the Council of
Europe between 1949 and 1951. Conservative political philosophy is often underestimated as
a cause of the party’s Euroscepticism. Inspired by Burke’s reaction to the French Revolution,
British Conservatives have always remained opposed to the revolutionary ideal in politics.
Instead, they believe that change must slowly evolve. From this perspective, newly-created
European institutions lack the authority of custom and a successful history, and are foreign to
British traditions (66). This attitude may also help explain why the Strasbourg Tories failed to
use the Council of Europe as a bridge between the UK and the Six. In her second paper, Ska¨r
identifies three reasons why their efforts remained fruitless. First, there was a lack of leader-
ship from Churchill. Second, the Tories were suspicious of any threat to national sovereignty.
Finally, Jean Monnet favoured direct, bilateral relations between the UK and the ECSC’s High
Authority instead of having them pass through the Council of Europe, which included many
non-ECSC members.
The next three papers consider the Council of Europe in more detail. Gruner explores
the perception of Europe in the debates of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of
Europe between 1949 and 1951. The members, selected by national parliaments rather than
governments, were generally convinced that Europeans needed a common institution which
could offer them “the prospect of becoming citizens of a continental community, which would
guarantee them liberty and security” (91). Gonc¸alves Martins turns his attention to the cultural
activities of the Council of Europe, showing how some core cultural goals have remained
unchanged since its formation while other goals have been added over the years. He also
briefly explains how these cultural activities have been affected by EU institutions. Bitsch
concludes the triptych of papers on the Council of Europe with an examination of the debates
about European identity which surrounded the eastward expansion in membership. She argues
that, next to the broad stipulation that Member States must be democratic and the contested idea
that the Council’s members should belong to the European “cultural community”, geography
plays an important role. Yet even geography is a flexible criterion, since it is difficult to draw
precise boundaries between what is European and what is not. The enlargement debates show
that the concept of European identity is pluralist and can evolve.
Poidevin next considers the role of the ECSC in forging a European identity. He argues that a
sense of Europeanness was born and developed in Luxembourg, since the various “Eurocrats” of
the High Authority were able to define a supranational European interest. Kaiser reflects on the
EFTA and the European identities of the “outer seven” (Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal,
Sweden, Switzerland and the UK) between 1958 and 1972. While EFTA’s membership was
too diverse to permit the formulation of a distinct identity, it did contribute to the emergence
and consolidation of political conceptions of Europe (183).
Hereafter, three papers examine the role of “Europe” in international relations. Bossuat
and Vaicbourdt study American views of European integration following the rejection of
the European Defence Community by the French legislature in August 1954, while Perron
considers the relationship between the EEC and the United States, focusing on the examination
of the Treaty of Rome at the GATT in 1957. Finally, Ludlow looks at the development of
a distinctive European way of conducting diplomacy, focusing on the way in which the Six
handled the discussions surrounding the question of British membership between October 1961
and January 1963. He argues that this period shows evidence of four significant innovations
compared to traditional diplomacy. The very existence of Community institutions reduced the
bargaining room with the UK; the regular meetings between the Six encouraged more moderate
positions; since the other five Member States were convinced of the necessity of reaching
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compromises, they saw as legitimate the many problems raised by the French delegation;
and finally the increase of Community agreements limited what Member States could offer
third parties in bilateral negotiations. The first part of the book concludes with two studies of
cooperation in matters of security. Ghebali examines how the pan-European idea was affected
by the fall of the Berlin wall, which has led to a situation in which the “European security
community” now stretches from Vancouver to Vladivostok. Romer in turn explicates the rush
among newly-independent States in central and eastern Europe to join western alliances.
The second part of the book under review, devoted to exploring the role of individuals
acting within common institutions, commences with three papers about the evolution of the
European Parliament and Commission. Riondel examines the early years of the parliamentary
Assembly, concluding that although many of the institutional reforms promoted by federalist
politicians 40 years ago have been achieved, their desire to make the Parliament a major force
for the emergence of a European identity has yet to be realized. Ludlow’s paper adopts a
similar tone with respect to the European Commission. Focusing on the Service de Presse et de
l’Information, he argues that the Commission successfully kept opinion leaders informed, but
failed to speak to ordinary European citizens. Ludlow concludes that the reduced dynamism
that accompanied the scaling-down of the Commission’s political ambitions in the late 1960s
indicates how vital it had been to believe that the creation of a new European identity was
near at hand. Finally, Bitsch questions whether the creation of a single Commission out of
the three existing bodies was simply a technical reform or rather a political move designed to
reinforce or accelerate the process of integration. Although those in favour of fusion raised
three political arguments – it would lead to greater political unification, allow the Commission
to improve its image, and make the European project more transparent – it finally occurred in
1967, at a time when the prospects of forging a common European identity appeared far from
evident.
This attention to the Parliament and Commission in general is followed by four papers which
focus on the actions and thoughts of specific individuals. Riondel’s piece considers Maurice
Faure’s opinions, Neri Gualdesi examines Altiero Spinelli’s actions, Loth writes about the
conflict between Charles de Gaulle and Walter Hallstein in 1965, while Rometsch concludes
with an examination of the impact of Jacques Delors on European integration. All four papers
provide fascinating accounts of the impact of personnages politiques on the development of
European identity. Along similar lines, Constantinesco’s paper assesses the role of the European
Council in the emergence of a European identity. He argues that regular meetings between the
political leaders of the Member States act as catalyst for the expression of a common identity.
Gerkrath’s contribution considers the part played by the ECJ in the emergence of a European
identity. He argues that the Court’s “constitutionalization” of the Treaty of Rome has provided
the citizens of the Member States with a common set of laws out of which to construct a com-
mon identity. Through its jurisprudence, the ECJ insisted that “Europe” constitutes a new legal
order which limits the sovereignty of the Member States, made individuals (rather than simply
States) subjects of this new legal order, and argued for the direct application of Community
law. Nevertheless, the Court’s insistence that the Treaty of Rome is a constitution might mask
the fact that it was signed by States rather than by citizens (473). The penultimate paper by
Palayret explores the role of the European University Institute in Florence in the development
of an “academic” European identity between 1948 and 1990. Since its establishment in 1976,
the EUI has rapidly grown to become one of the largest PhD granting institutions in the social
sciences and humanities in Europe. Finally, the conclusion by Bitsch restates the book’s themes
or central questions: how is European identity defined within common institutions? How do
institutions seek to reinforce this identity? How do institutions succeed in managing European
diversity? While the answers to these questions remain tentative, this book is a strong collection
of fine pieces of scholarship.
Willem Maas
Yale University
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Evelyn Ellis, EC Sex Equality Law, second edition, Oxford Community law series, Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1998. xxvi + 365 pages. GBP 60.
The book under review is the second, thouroghly revised and updated edition of a textbook
on EC sex equality law first published by Ellis in 1991. In five chapters, the book contains
a detailed and critical examination of EC sex equality law. The first chapter is a very useful
general introduction to EC law, dealing with issues such as the importance of EC Law in the
Member States, forms of EC law, the nature of EC law and the constitutional scope of EC law.
Chapter 2 addresses equal pay. Chapter 3 deals with equal treatment. Chapter 4 (somewhat
shorter) is about sex equality in social security. The final chapter 5 critically deals with the
policy underlying EC sex equality law and makes useful suggestions for legal and strategic
changes.
The book is very comprehensive. It not only deals extensively with EC sex equality law as it
stands, but also explains the historical background of the relevant provisions and their place in
the wider context of international law (such as ILO law and the ECHR). The book also refers
to the relevant EC soft law measures (which cover far more issues than the existing legislation)
and mentions relevant bodies within the Community (such as the Advisory Committee on
Equal Opportunities for Women and Men, the Parliament’s Standing Committee on Women’s
Rights and the European Women’s Lobby). Explaining and commenting on the case law on
issues of sex equality handed down by the ECJ is quite a task given the amount of case law
existing, even on specific aspects. An illustrative example is the interpretation of the notion
“pay” in Art. 141 (ex 119) EC: in the book, this alone takes some 45 pages (including the
difficult question whether pensions are pay). Further, this case law is constantly increasing
which obviously makes it impossible for any textbook to be totally up to date. For instance,
Ellis refers to the “Emmott principle” according to which “until such time as a directive has
been properly transposed, a defaulting Member State may not rely on an individual’s delay in
initiating proceedings against it in order to protect rights conferred upon him by the provisions
of the directive and that a period laid down by national law within which proceedings must be
initiated cannot begin to run before that time”. While indicating that there might be limits to
this principle, Ellis in this second edition of her book does not yet refer to the 1997 Fantask
decision (see p. 52/53 and 162). This decision is decisive in this context, but was probably
handed down after the manuscript for the book had been finished. In Fantask the ECJ clarified
that the solution adopted in Emmott was justified by the particular circumstances of that case
only and that it is not valid as a general principle (Case C-188/95, Fantask [1997] ECR I-6783,
paras. 50/51). In other words, it is now clear that there is no Emmott principle as referred
to in the book. Another example is the UEAPME case on the validity of the directive on
parental leave, decided in 1998. This case is especially interesting as it dealt for the first
time with the validity of a Community measure adopted under one of the special legislative
procedures provided for by the Social Agreement (now integrated into the EC Treaty): the
directive implements a framework agreement concluded by some European Social Partners
(meaning that the substance of the legislation is not made by Community institutions but rather
by certain Social Partners). The UEAPME case involves important questions of standing in
the framework of the annulment procedure (Case T-135/96, UEAPME, [1998] ECR II-2335).
The CFI held that given the lack of involvement of the European Parliament in the legislative
procedure at issue, the democratic element of such legislation consists in the involvement of the
Social Partners. Therefore, Social Partners which have a right to participate in the procedure
are indeed directly and individually concerned by the directive and therefore entitled to ask the
Court for the annulment of the measure concerned. The Court denied, however, that this was
the case regarding the plaintiff. UEAPME appealed; however, the appeal was later withdrawn.
In his foreword to the book under review, A.G. Jacobs (also the general editor of the Oxford
Community Law series) states that within EC law, Sex Equality Law is a subject of intrinsic
importance as it brings together questions of fundamental human rights, issues of great social
importance, and policy matters of very considerable economic significance. He points out
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that the principles developed in this specific field of law and the lessons to be learnt are
often relevant across the whole field of Community Law (as illustrated by both Emmott and
UEAPME). Mr Jacobs therefore concludes that the subject is one which is indispensable for all
students of the workings of Community law. Having read Prof. Ellis’ book, one would indeed




M. Furse, Competition Law of the UK & EC. London: Blackstone Press Limited, 1999, 320
pages. GBP 18.95
The founding fathers of the EC Treaty must be enjoying the current harmonization craze and
are looking down upon us with smiles on their faces. It seems, they will probably be thinking,
that the best way to achieve harmonization at an EC level is not to impose it upon Member
States. Whilst some harmonization proposals have crawled through the EC legislative process
with much procrastination, all Member States have now, voluntarily, adopted laws modelled
on Article 81 (ex 85) and Article 82 (ex 86) EC. Even the UK, albeit the last to do so, has
joined the party with the adoption of the Competition Act 1998, which is due to come into
force on 1 March 2000.
Given this natural alignment with EC law it was inevitable that the publishing industry
would follow suit. Whereas previously two books would be needed to cover national and EC
competition law, now one will suffice. Mark Furse is amongst one of the first authors to attempt
such a publication (see also, e.g. Ottervanger, Steenbergen, van der Voorde, Competition Law
of the European Community, the Netherlands and Belgium, Kluwer Law International, 1998).
Like any good novel, a legal text should have a good beginning. Furse gets off to a good
start with an introduction to competition law which takes the reader from 483 AD, through
medieaval Europe, the Sherman Act, right up to the European Commission’s recent vertical
restraints proposals. This gives the reader the ability to place all that follows in its historical
context. Designed as a textbook, the book’s 17 chapters provide invaluable background to the
law, administrative procedures and economics of both the new UK regime and the EC regime.
The text is clear and concise with law and economics interwoven seamlessly. Helpful and
clear summaries of the main cases are given, although there are too many references to US
competition law for my liking, there is enough EC case law around nowadays without the
need to cross the Atlantic for our legal precedents. Many clear practical examples are given,
putting the law and economics into an everyday context that will help the comprehension of
many competition students. My only grievances are the lack of space given to the new UK
Competition Act in favour of the old law which is just about to be repealed (in one chapter
more space is given to the Competition Act 1980, most of which has only six months to live,
than to the Competition Act 1998). These minor gripes aside, this is one of the clearer texts on
the market. Any student reading the book will be rewarded with a sound understanding of the
law and economics of UK and EC competition law.
Clive Gordon
London
